30 July 2025

Please click HERE to download the full article in PDF.

INTRODUCTION
In a significant development in Malaysia’s industrial relations landscape, the Industrial Court has issued a cease and desist order against a trade union via an interim award. The case, Malayan Banking Berhad v National Union of Bank Employees (Award No. 1147 of 2025), arose from an ongoing trade dispute involving allegations of sexual harassment at the workplace. The interim award, issued while the main dispute remains pending, marks a significant instance of the Court exercising its statutory powers to regulate proceedings and preserve the integrity of the adjudicatory process.

BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE
The dispute centres on allegations made by a former employee of Malayan Banking Berhad (“the Bank”) against her superior. In 2021, the former employee verbally reported inappropriate conduct by the said officer. The matter was addressed internally and resolved on an informal basis. However, in 2024, she lodged a formal grievance that revived the matter, prompting renewed engagement from the Bank and support from the National Union of Bank Employees (“the Union”).

After the Minister of Human Resources referred the matter to the Industrial Court for adjudication, the Union began issuing public statements, publishing social media content, and organising nationwide pickets in relation to the ongoing dispute. In response, the Bank filed an application seeking an interim order to restrain the Union from continuing with these actions while the case was pending before the Court.

ISSUE BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COURT
The central issue before the Court was whether it possessed the jurisdiction, under the Industrial Relations Act 1967 (‘IRA 1967’), to grant a cease and desist order as an interim measure. This raised important questions of statutory interpretation, particularly as the IRA 1967 does not expressly provide for such relief. The application thus required the Court to consider whether it could invoke its incidental powers to regulate the conduct of parties during the pendency of proceedings.

INDUSTRIAL COURT’S DECISION
The Industrial Court allowed the application and issued the cease and desist order, characterising it as a procedural measure rather than an injunction in the conventional sense. The Court acknowledged that applications of this nature are rare but concluded that it was empowered under Sections 28^[1] and 29(g)^[2] of the IRA 1967 to regulate its own process and take such steps as are necessary to ensure the fair and orderly disposal of disputes.

The Court clarified that the order sought was not an injunction in the traditional civil sense, something the Industrial Court has no power to grant, but rather a procedural measure aimed at preserving the status quo and protecting the integrity of the adjudicatory process. The Court considered it essential to prevent the escalation of public commentary and protests that could undermine the administration of justice and the perception of impartiality.

Importantly, the Industrial Court drew a distinction between substantive “trade disputes” that require formal ministerial reference under Section 26 of the IRA1967 and procedural or ancillary applications like the one before it. It found that because the substance of the Union’s campaign was directly related to the subject matter of the trade dispute already referred to the Court, the cease and desist application fell within its scope of power. To do otherwise, the Court reasoned, would render it a “toothless tiger”, unable to protect its own processes from interference.

In reaching its decision, the Court adopted a purposive approach to statutory interpretation, in line with Section 17A of the Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967. It also referenced comparable decisions from jurisdictions such as India^[3] and New Zealand^[4] which were raised by the Counsel for the Bank, where quasi-judicial tribunals have been empowered to restrain public commentary or industrial action that might compromise ongoing proceedings.

Having examined the facts, the Court found that the Union’s public campaign—including numerous social media postings, press articles, and picketing—was closely tied to the subject matter of the dispute before the Court. In its view, the continued dissemination of commentary and protest activity posed a risk to the fair conduct of the proceedings and justified interim restraint.

KEY TAKEAWAYS
This interim award highlights the Industrial Court’s ability to exercise incidental powers to regulate party conduct during the adjudication of trade disputes, even in the absence of express statutory language authorising such orders. It underscores the Court’s commitment to ensuring that its processes are protected from conduct that may be perceived as prejudicial or disruptive. The decision also illustrates the importance of statutory interpretation that aligns with the broader purpose of the Industrial Relations Act, which is to facilitate fair, balanced, and orderly dispute resolution.

For unions, the case serves as a reminder that once a matter has been formally referred to the Court, ongoing public commentary or protest related to the dispute may, in certain circumstances, raise legal concerns about the integrity of the adjudication process. For employers and legal practitioners, the award provides useful insight into the scope of procedural remedies available in complex industrial matters. Ultimately, this decision offers valuable guidance for all stakeholders in navigating the balance between industrial advocacy and respect for judicial proceedings.

Authors:

^[1] S. 28 IRA 1967 – Power of President to regulate procedure and proceedings: Save as otherwise expressly herein provided and subject to any regulations that may be made in that behalf, the President may regulate the procedure and proceedings of the Court as he thinks fit and, with the approval of the Minister, make rules governing such procedure and proceedings.

^[2] S. 29(g) IRA 1967 – Power of the Court: The Court may, in any proceedings before it – (g) generally direct and do all such things as are necessary or expedient for the expeditious determination of the matter before it.

^[3] Vidyut Metallics Pvt Ltd v Maharashtra Rajya Rashriya Kamgar Sangh and Others [2008] SCC Online Bom 303

^[4] Burrows v Moore, Commissioner of Rangiora High School [2016] NZERA Christchurch 93

Please email your details to look@zulrafique.com.my if you would like to subscribe to our Knowledge Centre.

Let’s Connect!
➭ LINKEDIN: Zul Rafique & Partners
➭ INSTAGRAM: @zrplaw