16 October 2025

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The right to appeal has long been recognised as a substantive right and forms an integral part of the administration of justice. However, with effect from 1 October 2022, the introduction of section 68(1)(f) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 (“CJA”) significantly curtailed the right to appeal against interlocutory decisions such as the dismissal of striking out applications. The rationale behind this amendment was pragmatic. It sought to expedite the clearing of cases through the courts by reducing the interlocutory appeals that often disrupt trial timelines and burden the Court of Appeal, given the substantive right of appeal that each litigant is entitled to once the parties’ rights have been finally disposed of at the end of the trial.

Yet, the amendment sparked considerable debate. Did Parliament intend to impose a blanket prohibition on appeals from dismissed striking out applications, even in cases where such dismissals effectively determine the parties’ substantive rights?

The Federal Court has now answered this question in the recent decision of MT Ventures Sdn Bhd & Another v QM Print Sdn Bhd [2025] 6 MLRA 595, heard together with Azinal Sdn Bhd v Jannath Gani & 2 Others(Civil Appeal No. 02(i)-17-06/2024(W)). The Federal Court provided much needed clarity, holding that section 68(1)(f) does not create a blanket ban on appealing the dismissal of a striking out application.

An appeal remains permissible where the dismissal of a striking out application finally disposes of the parties’ rights, for instance, where the High Court’s decision rests upon a preliminary point of law or jurisdiction which has the capacity to determine the entire cause or action finally without the need for further oral evidence. Such issues might include questions of locus standi, state immunity or other threshold conditions.

In delivering the judgment, Nallini Pathmanathan FCJ observed that the interpretation of section 68(1)(f) CJA cannot be approached in a literal and grammarian fashion. Instead, the provision must be read holistically and harmoniously with other relevant provisions of the CJA, in particular, section 67 which confers upon the Court of Appeal the general jurisdiction to hear appeals from “any judgment or order… in any civil cause or matter,” and section 3 which defines a “decision.”

When read together, these provisions make clear that section 68(1)(f) CJA only bars appeals against orders that do not finally dispose of the rights of parties, that is, where the High Court determines further oral evidence needs to be adduced in order for it to arrive at a decision which finally disposes of the parties’ rights. Section 68(1)(f) does not come into play where the striking out of a writ or pleading finally disposes of the parties’ rights. In short, the Federal Court clarifies that section 68(1)(f) CJA does not alter but merely reinforce the entrenched position in law that generally no appeals are available under sections 67 and 3 CJA where no rights of the parties have been finally disposed.

This landmark clarification restores balance between judicial efficiency and the litigant’s right to appellate recourse, reaffirming that while the courts aim to streamline proceedings, the door to justice should never be completely shut where a party’s substantive rights are at stake.

Authors:

Disclaimer: The contents do not constitute legal advice, are not intended to be a substitute for legal advice and should not be relied upon as such.

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